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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the constitutionality of 
capital punishment for adolescents is a study in vacillation.  In Thompson 
v. Oklahoma,1 the Court reversed the death penalty imposed on a 
fifteen-year-old.2  It was a five-four decision,3 but only four justices 
agreed that fifteen-year-olds, across-the-board, were not mature 
enough to warrant execution.4  Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in the 
judgment was, however, very narrow.  Her concern was that Oklahoma 
had not made an explicit policy choice that such minors should be 
executed.5  She made quite clear that although “adolescents are 
generally less blameworthy than adults who commit similar crimes—it 
does not necessarily follow that all fifteen-year-olds are incapable of the 
moral culpability that would justify the imposition of capital 
punishment.”6
A year later, in Stanford v. Kentucky,7 the Supreme Court upheld 
executions of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.8  The majority noted that 
the common-law rebuttable presumption of infancy theoretically would 
have permitted capital punishment to be imposed on those children over 
the age of seven who demonstrated sufficient mens rea and moral 
culpability.9  Since a majority of states in 1989 authorized capital 
punishment for sixteen-year-olds, the majority concluded that there was 
no national consensus that executing such minors was inhumane.10
 1. 487 U.S. 815.  Justice Stevens wrote the plurality opinion which Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined.  O’Connor filed an opinion concurring in the 
judgment.  Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice White joined.  Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision of the case.  Id. at 817. 
 2. Id. at 838. 
 3. Id. at 817. 
 4. Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.  Id. at 815. 
 5. The defendant had become subject to the death penalty simply because he had 
been certified as an adult, and in Oklahoma adults were subject to capital punishment. 
See id. at 857-58 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 6. Id. at 853. 
 7. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 8. Id. at 380. 
 9. Id. at 368 (“At that time, the common law set the rebuttable presumption of 
incapacity to commit any felony at the age of 14, and theoretically permitted capital 
punishment to be imposed on anyone over the age of 7.”).  The common law also had an 
irrebuttable presumption of infancy for children under seven.  See 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 22-24 (stating that the infancy defense was operative as 
early as the reign of Edward III); see also A.W.G. Kean, The History of the Criminal 
Liability of Children, 53 L.Q. REV. 364 (1937) (analyzing the antiquity and evolution of 
the infancy defense). 
 10. See id. at 370-71 (“This does not establish the degree of national consensus this 
Court has previously thought sufficient to label a particular punishment cruel and 
unusual.”). 
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In Roper v. Simmons,11 the Supreme Court, again five-four,12 created 
an Eighth Amendment categorical bar to execution of persons who 
commit capital crimes when they are under the age of eighteen.13  The 
decision in Stanford, rejecting the identical claim, was held to be “no 
longer controlling on this issue.”14  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
relied heavily on Atkins v. Virginia,15 which prohibited capital punishment 
for retarded people.16  He also made clear that the Court had an obligation to 
make its “own independent judgment” in determining “whether the 
death penalty is . . . disproportionate” and thus violates the Eighth 
Amendment.17
Although we recognize that capital cases are often sui generis and may 
not be of strong precedential value in other contexts,18 we think that the 
 11. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
 12. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion in which Justices Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.  Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion in which Justice 
Ginsburg joined.  Justice O’Connor filed a dissenting opinion.  Justice Scalia filed a 
dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined.  Id. at 
1187. 
 13. Id. at 1200. 
 14. Id. at 1198 (“To the extent Stanford was based on review of the objective 
indicia of consensus that obtained in 1989 . . . it suffices to note that those indicia have 
changed.”). 
 15. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 16. Id. at 321 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)). 
 17. See Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1192. 
 18. Nancy J. King, How Different Is Death?  Jury Sentencing in Capital and 
Non-Capital Cases Compared, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 195, 200 (2004) (“Jury 
sentences short of death lack the finality that triggers the Eighth Amendment’s 
requirements for guiding jury discretion. . . . The contrast between this affirmative 
embrace of inconsistency in non-capital jury sentencing and the condemnation of the 
same in capital sentencing is one of the most striking examples of the difference that 
death makes.”); see also Jeffrey Abramson, Death-is-Different Jurisprudence and the 
Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 119 (2004) (“[T]he Court has 
insisted that a sui generis due process of death is necessary before any particular person 
can be picked out to die.”).  Compare Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 266, 272, 285 
(1980) (holding that life sentence for a recidivist offender convicted of stealing less than 
$200 was not barred by the Eighth Amendment and noting that the theme of “the unique 
nature of the death penalty for purposes of Eighth Amendment analysis, has been 
repeated time and time again in our opinions”), with Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296-97, 
303 (1983) (reversing a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole under a 
recidivist statute where defendant had committed seven relatively minor offenses).  But see 5 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.1(b), at 1196 (2d ed. 1999) 
(noting that while the “extensive and complex” procedures for imposing the death 
penalty “are unique to death sentencing, the Court’s efforts to interpret the Constitution’s 
safeguards in this context have influenced the development of procedure in other types 
of sentencing as well”). 




developmental and psychological distinctions between adults and 
adolescents, differences that the Simmons Court believed was constitutionally 
relevant regarding execution,19 should also be considered in determining 
the extent of punishment for juveniles who commit serious criminal acts.  
In particular, we argue that the Court’s recognition of the growth 
capacity of juveniles, and their reduced moral culpability, should weigh 
heavily in favor of a categorical bar against waiver of children to 
criminal court.  Furthermore, attempts to circumvent such a ruling by 
defining adults as sixteen or seventeen years of age for purposes of the 
criminal law should be prohibited. 
If these proposals are not accepted, and a child is charged and 
convicted of a serious crime in criminal court, the kind and extent of 
punishment imposed should be heavily influenced by the type of 
evidence relied on by the Simmons Court in finding that youths are not 
death eligible.  Either the Court should extend the Simmons rationale to 
prohibit life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or, at the 
least, create a presumption against such a sentence being imposed on an 
adolescent.  As Justice Kennedy noted, “the punishment of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular 
for a young person.”20  Even life imprisonment is rapidly becoming life 
without possibility of parole.  Defendants who use to be paroled in ten or 
twenty years are now dying in prison of old age.21
When children kill, as they always have and probably always will, the 
state must juggle two distinct and often conflicting concerns: its police 
power and its parens patriae interest.  These concerns are not, however, 
mutually exclusive.22  There is a delicate balance that must be maintained.  
 19. See Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1195 (considering three important differences 
between adults and adolescents). 
 20. Id. at 1196. 
 21. Adam Liptak, To More Inmates, Life Term Means Dying Behind Bars, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, at A1.  The article describes a man who, at fifteen, killed his 
girlfriend and was sentenced to life imprisonment.  The sentencing judge told the 
defendant in open court that if he behaved himself he would be paroled after a few years.  
He has spent thirty-five years in prison so far, and was recently denied parole even 
though he is a model prisoner and the girl’s family requested his parole.  This change is 
“driven by tougher laws and political pressure from governors and parole boards.”  Id. 
 22. See Irene Merker Rosenberg, Schall v. Martin: A Child Is a Child Is a Child, 
12 AM. J.  CRIM. L. 253, 268 (1984) (asserting that in delinquency cases the state has two 
interests—the state’s police power and its parens patriae concern and that both interests 
were “relied upon in upholding the challenged legislation” which permitted pretrial 
detention of juveniles charged with criminal acts); cf. Eric S. Janus, Hendricks and the 
Moral Terrain of Police Power Civil Commitment, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 297, 303 
(1998) (“The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing 
care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves; 
the state also has authority under its police power to protect the community from the 
dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.”); Eric S. Janus, Toward a Conceptual 
Framework for Assessing Police Power Commitment Legislation: A Critique of Schopp’s 
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Even during the more savage common-law era, children’s diminished 
responsibility was reflected by the irrebuttable presumption of incapacity 
for children under seven, and the rebuttable presumption of incapacity 
for those between seven and fourteen.23  But we are not wedded to that 
more primitive assessment of culpability.  Evolving standards of decency 
require that society takes a more refined approach in allocating responsibility 
and punishment for juveniles.  Clearly, the state must incapacitate and punish 
children who commit serious criminal acts, but, as Simmons says, that 
does not mean that minors can be executed, nor, as we maintain, be 
consigned to a living death behind bars without any hope of respite.  As 
the Court has said in another context, the legal system must somehow be 
adjusted “to account for children’s vulnerability and their needs for 
‘concern, . . . sympathy and . . . paternal attention.’”24
II.  THE COURT’S OPINION 
The facts in Simmons were gruesome.25  The defendant and his two 
younger friends broke into the victim’s home.  They then tied and 
gagged her, drove in her car to a river, and threw her in while she was 
still alive. This was planned and premeditated.26  These are the kinds of 
facts that usually induce the Court to deny relief,27 and indeed it may 
well be that the Court selected this case purposefully, to make it clear 
that no matter how heinous the offense, juveniles could not be considered 
death eligible.28
and Winick’s Explications of Legal Mental Illness, 76 NEB. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997) (“Police 
power and parens patriae considerations are often intertwined in discussions of civil 
commitment.”).  
 23. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at 22-24. 
 24. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality opinion) (quoting 
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971) (plurality opinion)). 
 25. See Scott R. Chapman, Juvenile Justice at a Crossroads, W. MASS. L. TRIB., 
Dec. 2004, at 11 (“The facts of the underlying crime are, no doubt, horrific. . . . On its 
face, Simmons does not make a good candidate for the rehabilitative model of the 
juvenile court.”). 
 26. For the full recital of facts, see Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1187-88 (2005). 
 27. See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT 138-40 (1987) (noting the 
generally conservative disposition of the judiciary towards capital cases); see also DAVID 
R. DOW, EXECUTED ON A TECHNICALITY: LETHAL INJUSTICE ON AMERICA’S DEATH ROW 
xxv-xxvi (2005) (“Judges who want to deny a murderer certain constitutional rights 
deploy the facts of the murder as a distraction, as a justification for ignoring the rule of 
law.”). 
 28. See Chapman, supra note 25, at 11 (asking whether the execution of a more 
sympathetic teenager would offend our sense of decency, and whether we have “reached 




The impetus for overruling Stanford was clearly Atkins.29  In Penry v. 
Lynaugh,30 decided the same day as Stanford,31 the Court held that there 
was no national consensus against executing the mentally retarded.32  In 
2002, the Atkins Court reconsidered Penry and concluded that evolving 
standards of decency required a categorical bar against execution of the 
mentally retarded.33  The Court looked to legislation and state practice,34 
and concluded that mental retardation “diminishes personal culpability 
even if the defendant can distinguish between right and wrong. . . .  The 
impairments of mentally retarded defendants make it less defensible to 
impose the death penalty as retribution for past crimes and less likely 
that the death penalty will have a real deterrent effect.”35
Just as in Atkins, the Court in Simmons counted jurisdictions to 
determine if there was a national consensus against the death penalty for 
juveniles.36  Thirty states prohibited capital punishment for the mentally 
the place and time in our society where we need to ‘draw a line in the sand’ sending the 
message that age is not relevant when you commit a horrific crime”); see also Carrie 
Martin, Spare the Death Penalty, Spoil the Child: How the Execution of Juveniles 
Violates the Eighth Amendment’s Ban on Cruel and Unusual Punishment in 2005, 46 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 695, 696 (2005) (“Do you believe that a teenager should be eligible for 
execution? . . . [I]f the teenager, after a botched robbery attempt, kidnapped a woman, 
threw her off a bridge with her hands tied behind her back and watched her drown. . . . 
Does your answer change?”). 
 29. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  After Atkins was decided, a number 
of commentators predicted that the juvenile death penalty would be next on the chopping 
block.  See, e.g., Jamie Hughes, For Mice or Men or Children? Will The Expansion of 
the Eighth Amendment in Atkins v. Virginia Force The Supreme Court to Re-Examine 
The Minimum Age For The Death Penalty?, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 973, 1007-08 
(2003) (stating that the Atkins Court had “redefined the term ‘national consensus’ within 
their Eighth Amendment jurisprudence” and that “[w]ith this opinion as precedent, the 
Court should examine age-related death penalty legislation and overturn Stanford v. 
Kentucky”). 
 30. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 31. The cases were decided on June 26, 1989.  See id. at 302; Stanford v. Kentucky, 
492 U.S. 361, 361 (1989). 
 32. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334-35 (“[T]here is insufficient evidence of a national 
consensus against executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses for us 
to conclude that it is categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 33. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (“[O]ur ‘evolving standards of decency,’ . . . conclude 
that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution ‘places a substantive 
restriction on the State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 34. Id. at 313-16 (noting a consistent shift against application of the death penalty 
to the mentally retarded and stating “[t]he practice . . . has become truly unusual, and it is 
fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it”); see also Roper v. 
Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1191 (2005) (referring to the above language in Atkins).
 35. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1192 (summarizing the reasoning in Atkins which 
assumed that the mentally retarded could not engage in what the Atkins Court called the 
“cold calculus that precedes the decision” to murder) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 319 (2002)). 
 36. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1192.  The Court explicitly noted the parallel to the 
methodology employed in Atkins, stating that “[t]he evidence of national consensus 
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retarded at the time of the Atkins decision37 and the same number 
prohibited the death penalty for juveniles at the time of Simmons.38  A 
major difference between Stanford, on the one hand, and Simmons and 
Atkins, on the other, was that the Court was now counting the states that 
rejected the death penalty for all persons.39  Justice Kennedy also stressed 
that several states had abolished capital punishment for juveniles in the 
interim between Stanford and Simmons,40 that very few states that 
permitted the death penalty for juveniles actually executed them,41 that 
Congress had excluded juveniles under the Death Penalty Act of 1994,42 
and pointed to the practices of other countries and treaties that prohibited 
capital punishment for juveniles under eighteen.43  Indeed, the “United 
against the death penalty for juveniles is similar, and in some respects parallel, to the 
evidence Atkins held sufficient to demonstrate a national consensus against the death 
penalty for the mentally retarded.”  Id. 
 37. Id. (“When Atkins was decided, 30 States prohibited the death penalty for the 
mentally retarded.”). 
 38. Id. (asserting that “30 States prohibit the juvenile death penalty”). 
 39. Of the thirty states Justice Kennedy counted as having abolished the death 
penalty for juveniles, twelve did not have any death penalty.  Id.  Had the Stanford Court 
used the Simmons methodology in 1989, it would have counted twenty-five states as 
having abolished the death penalty for juveniles (thirteen states had completely abolished 
the death penalty and twelve states had abolished it for sixteen- and seventeen-year-
olds).  Id. at 1208 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 
(1989) (“Of the 37 states whose laws permit capital punishment, 15 decline to impose it 
upon 16-year-old offenders and 12 decline to impose it on 17-year-old offenders.”).  The 
Court in Atkins only referred to eighteen states as having abolished the death penalty for 
mental retardation.  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 40. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1193.  Four states and the federal government abandoned 
the practice by legislation, one by judicial fiat.  Id. at 1211 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 41. The Simmons Court counted six states that had executed juveniles in the 
sixteen intervening years between Stanford and Simmons.  Id. at 1192.  The Court also 
noted, anecdotally, that Kentucky had pardoned Kevin Stanford, the offender whose 
sentence had been upheld in Stanford.  Id.  The Court in Simmons cited to Professor 
Victor Streib’s research on the subject.  Id. at 1192.  In addition to the statistics quoted by the 
Simmons Court, Streib’s research shows, among other things, that only twenty-two 
juvenile offenders had been executed since 1973 (roughly one execution every seventeen 
months), whereas at least 922 juvenile executions were recorded between 1642 and 1972 
(or about one every four months).  These twenty-two post-1972 juvenile offender 
executions represented 2.3% of all executions, and two-thirds of them were carried out 
by the state of Texas.  VICTOR L. STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH 
SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JANUARY 1, 1973—DECEMBER 31, 
2004 3 (2005), http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/documents/JuvDeathDec2004.pdf.  
Only one of the twenty-two executed offenders had been younger than seventeen at the 
time of the crime.  Id. at 5. 
 42. “[N]o person may be sentenced to death who was less than 18 years of age at 
the time of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (2000). 
 43. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1194, 1198-1200. 




States is the only country in the world that continues to give official 
sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”44
As the Court has noted, the death penalty is reserved for the worst of 
the worst, both in terms of offense and offender.45  Applying that concept, 
the Simmons Court noted three major differences between juveniles 
under eighteen and adults—immaturity and recklessness,46 susceptibility 
to external influences,47 and growth capacity.48  Although the Court 
conceded that there might be some adolescents who were as culpable as 
adults, it believed that there was  “an unacceptable likelihood . . . that the 
brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower 
mitigating arguments based on youth.”49  In support of this belief, the 
Court cited the prosecutor’s argument to the jury in the case at bar that 
the defendant’s youth was aggravating rather than mitigating.50  Thus, 
the Court was concerned that the cruelty of a particular murder would 
overcome the lesser culpability of an adolescent.  This possibility is not 
fanciful.  In a study, social scientists concluded that “when heinousness 
increases, it exerts a more powerful effect than age.”51  Based on these 
 44. Id. at 1198. 
 45. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (asserting that capital punishment should be 
limited to a narrow category of the most serious crimes and those most deserving of 
death due to extreme culpability). 
 46. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1195 (“‘A lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense 
of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable 
among the young.  These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and 
decisions.’”) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)); see also Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (holding that the courts must consider all 
relevant mitigating factors including age, background, and mental and emotional 
development in death penalty cases, and that “minors, especially in their earlier years, 
generally are less mature and responsible than adults. . . . minors often lack the 
experience, perspective, and judgment expected of adults”). 
 47. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1195 (“[J]uveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible 
to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”); see also 
Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115 (“[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact.  It is a time and 
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to 
psychological damage.”). 
 48. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1195 (“[T]he character of a juvenile is not as well 
formed as that of an adult.”); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) 
(plurality opinion) (holding that the execution of a person under 16 years is 
unconstitutional and noting that “[i]nexperience, less education, and less intelligence 
make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at 
the same time he or she is more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure 
than is an adult”). 
 49. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1197. 
 50. Id. at 1189 ( “In rebuttal, the prosecutor gave the following response: ‘Age, he 
says.  Think about age.  Seventeen years old.  Isn’t that scary?  Doesn’t that scare you?  
Mitigating?  Quite the contrary I submit.  Quite the contrary.’”). 
 51. Norma J. Finkel, Prestidigitation, Statistical Magic, and Supreme Court 
Numerology in Juvenile Death Penalty Cases, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L. 612, 636 
(1995). 
MARRUS.DOC 12/22/2005  10:27 AM 
[VOL. 42:  1151, 2005]  Keeping Kids Out of Adult Criminal Court 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1159 
 
considerations, the majority opted for a per se rule rather than a standard 
allowing juries to weigh the mitigating and aggravating factors.52
Justice Scalia, joined by then Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Thomas, dissented.  He took issue with every aspect of the majority opinion.  
In his view, states that had no death penalty were saying nothing special 
about executing juveniles.53  He likened the majority’s reliance on scientific 
and sociological studies to “look[ing] over the heads of the crowd and 
picking out its friends.”54  In other words, there were conflicting studies,55 
and in such a situation, he argued, the legislature is best equipped to 
 52. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (discussing the differences between interpreting law using a 
rule based approach which leaves out subjective factors and a standard based approach 
that incorporates various subjective factors). 
 53. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1219 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]hose 12 States 
considered none of the factors . . . before us today—lower culpability of the young, inherent 
recklessness, lack of capacity for considered judgment, etc.”). 
 54. Id. at 1222-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (applying a metaphor to illustrate the 
point that “[e]verything from variations in the survey methodology, such as the choice of 
the target population, the sampling design used, the questions asked, and the statistical 
analyses used to interpret the data can skew the results”). 
 55. Id. at 1223 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he American Psychological Association 
(APA), which claims in this case that scientific evidence shows persons under 18 lack 
the ability to take moral responsibility for their decisions, has previously taken precisely 
the opposite position before this very Court.  In its brief in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 
U.S. 417 . . . (1990), the APA found a ‘rich body of research’ showing that juveniles are 
mature enough to decide whether to obtain an abortion without parental involvement.”);   
see Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents’ 
Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
129, 129-30 (1992) (conducting a study on 75 adolescent women and finding that the 
cognition level of adolescents 15 and older were similar to adults).  Compare Elizabeth 
S. Scott & Thomas Grisso,  The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective 
On Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 159-60, 165 (1997) 
(“[S]cientific research and theory support the claim that adolescents are more competent 
decision-makers than has been presumed under paternalistic policies, but the scientific 
evidence for the claim that their cognitive decision-making capacity is comparable to 
that of adults is unclear,” particularly in stressful situations and on “the street . . . .  Thus, 
adolescents on the street, who are making choices that lead to criminal conduct, may be 
less able than adults to consider alternative options that could extricate them from a 
precarious situation.”), with Barry C. Feld, Competence, Culpability, and Punishment: 
Implications of Atkins for Executing and Sentencing Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
463, 515-21 (2003) (noting that adolescents are less capable of controlling their 
impulsive behavior than adults are because the pre-frontal cortex of the frontal lobe is 
not fully developed).  During adolescence, the brain goes through a process of 
myelination where the brain matter shifts from gray to white.  This process starts in the 
back of the brain.  Therefore, the frontal cortex develops last.  During this time, 
adolescents rely on the amygdala to make decisions.  This part of the brain is the “gut 
reaction” part.  Therefore, adolescents act on impulse when making decisions.  Id. 




decide “which view of science is the right one.”56  The Court’s consideration 
of foreign law he asserted, “ought to be rejected out of hand.”57  Perhaps 
what disturbed him the most was that the Court used its “own judgment” in 
deciding whether the death penalty for adolescents was proportional.58   
As always, he yearns for an “originalist” approach to Eighth Amendment 
analysis, just as he does in other areas of constitutional law.59
Justice O’Connor dissented in a separate opinion.  She agreed with 
much of the majority’s reasoning, including the need for the Court to use 
its own independent judgment.60  Her concern was application of the 
law.61  In her view there was simply insufficient evidence of a national 
consensus, unlike the situation in Atkins, and sparse empirical evidence 
 56. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1223 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the courts 
may only consider the “limited evidence on the record before them,” whereas the 
legislature may “‘evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local 
conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the courts’”) 
(citations omitted). 
 57. Id. at 1226 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]n many significant respects the laws of 
most other countries differ from our law—including not only such explicit provisions of 
our Constitution as the right to jury trial and grand jury indictment, but even many 
interpretations of the Constitution prescribed by this Court itself.”). 
 58. Id. at 1221-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the rule allowing the Court to 
use its own judgment was rejected in Stanford). 
 59. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 371-72, 378 (1995) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the originalist approach in an anonymous electioneering 
case, stating that “[t]he question posed by the present case is not the easiest sort to 
answer for those who adhere to the Court’s (and the society’s) traditional view that the 
Constitution bears its original meaning and is unchanging.”  He later clarifies the 
difficulty of an originalist view by noting “[w]here the meaning of a constitutional text 
(such as ‘the freedom of speech’) is unclear, the widespread and long-accepted practices 
of the American people are the best indication of what fundamental beliefs it was 
intended to enshrine.”); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 
849, 852-62 (1989) (discussing the differences between originalism and non-originalism 
and stating “I prefer . . . originalism”); see, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 
127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion) (arguing that the most specific, rather than general 
historical traditions relating to a person’s rights should be looked at and finding no 
constitutional violation when a biological father is denied visitation rights to see his child 
when the mother is married to another man at the time of the child’s birth because it is 
the marital family, not the “adulterous natural father” that has been traditionally 
protected) (no other justice joined Justice Scalia’s conclusion in note 6); see also, e.g., 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that the federal government 
may not require the state’s executives to conduct background checks on prospective 
handgun purchasers under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act because there is 
a lack of historical evidence that the early Congresses commanded the state’s officers to 
perform certain functions and therefore the law violates the dual sovereignty that the 
Framers of the Constitution designed). 
 60. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1207 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[W]e . . . have a 
‘constitutional obligation’ to judge for ourselves whether the death penalty is excessive 
punishment for a particular offense or class of offenders.”). 
 61. Id. at 1209 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[A]lthough the general principles that 
guide our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence afford some common ground, I part ways 
with the Court in applying them to the case before us.”). 
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of the differences between adults and older adolescents.62  She differentiated 
the characteristics of mentally retarded persons and adolescents.  The 
former have an impairment that makes it “highly unlikely”63 they could 
be deserving of the death penalty, a status that she thought was different 
from chronological age.64
III.  IMMATURITY, PEER PRESSURE, AND BRAIN DEVELOPMENT 
There has been an angry response to Simmons, at least in certain 
quarters.  Families of victims were outraged by the decision, arguing that 
the Court did not understand the number and dangerousness of violent 
teenagers.65  The intensity of anti-Simmons sentiment can also be seen in 
the stance taken by some states, at least those in which criminal 
defendants are deemed adult at the age of seventeen.  The most vociferous 
voices were those from Texas, the state which has consistently executed 
 62. Id. at 1213 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s proportionality argument . . . fails 
to establish that the differences in maturity between 17-year-olds and young ‘adults’ are 
both universal enough and significant enough to justify a bright-line prophylactic rule 
against capital punishment of the former”). 
 63. Id. at 1209 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 64. Id. at 1214 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[I]t defies common sense to suggest 
that 17-year-olds as a class are somehow equivalent to mentally retarded persons with 
regard to culpability or susceptibility to deterrence.  Seventeen-year-olds may, on 
average, be less mature than adults, but that lesser maturity simply cannot be equated 
with the major, lifelong impairments suffered by the mentally retarded.”). 
 65. Among them was Elaine Wild, whose sister was Simmons’s victim.  The St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch reported the following several months after the Simmons ruling: 
She couldn’t believe the verdict.  She didn’t buy the underdeveloped brain 
defense.  “He knew what he was doing the whole time,” she said.  In fact, 
Simmons had talked about killing someone in the days leading up to the 
murder.  And the world consensus just didn’t make sense to her.  Couldn’t 
those justices in Washington understand?  He didn’t give Shirley [Crook] a 
chance.  Why should he get a chance? 
March 1, 2005, the day the Supreme Court handed down its ruling, was a day 
of tears. 
“I don’t know what to do,” Elaine said through big sniffles that day.  Every 
short phrase was punctuated with a pause to catch her breath. “That was it. 
There’s nothing else to do. And it tears my heart out.” 
James Carlson, Victim’s Sister Tries to Live On, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 
24, 2005, at B1; see also Jon Sawyer, Court Bars Juvenile Executions, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, March 2, 2005, at A1 (quoting a leader of the pro-capital punishment 
advocacy group Justice For All). 




more people than any other jurisdiction.66  Texas also housed more 
juveniles on death row than any other state.67
After the Simmons decision came down, some judges and prosecutors 
in Texas took the position that Simmons was a narrow opinion that 
would not apply to the execution of seventeen-year-olds in the state.68  
They reasoned that under Texas law seventeen-year-olds are considered 
adults for purposes of the criminal law,69 and the state penal code 
explicitly allows seventeen-year-olds to be death eligible.70  Evidently 
such commentators did not understand that the majority opinion made it 
very clear that it was chronological, not legal, age that was relevant.71
The Simmons majority looked at “scientific and sociological studies”72 
to establish “that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified 
among the worst offenders.”73  The first trait differentiating juveniles from 
adults is immaturity and “an underdeveloped sense of responsibility.”74  
The Court cited and quoted from an article showing that “adolescents are 
overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of reckless 
behavior.”75  The states recognize this fact, and limit ages at which 
 66. See Death Penalty Information Center, Number of Executions by State Since 
1976, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid= 8&did=186 (last visited Oct 29, 
2005). 
 67. See STREIB, supra note 41, at 3, 11 (“Almost two-thirds of the current-era 
executions of juvenile offenders have occurred in Texas” and between the years 1973 
and 2004, “Texas (58 sentences) [was] the clear leader in this practice, followed at quite 
a distance by Florida (32 sentences) and then Alabama (25 sentences).  These 3 states 
together account for over half (115/228) of all juvenile death sentences.  Only 7 states 
have imposed 10 or more such sentences.”). 
 68. The Abilene Reporter-News quoted opinions from a local judge and a county 
district attorney that the Simmons “ruling doesn’t mean prosecutors will not be allowed 
to seek the death penalty for offenders younger than 18 in Texas.”  Jason Sheehan, Death 
Penalty Ruling to Have Only Limited Effect Here, ABILENE REPORTER-NEWS, Mar. 5, 
2005 (Local).   
 69. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02 (Vernon 2004) (“‘[C]hild’ means a person who 
is: (A) ten years of age or older and under 17 years of age.”). 
 70. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.07 (Vernon 2004) (“[N]o person may, in any case, 
be punished by death for an offense committed while he was younger than 17 years.”). 
 71. In addition, Appendix A of the Court’s opinion listed the twenty states that 
permitted the death penalty for those under eighteen, and Texas was of course one of 
those jurisdictions.  The governor of Texas subsequently and reluctantly commuted the 
death sentences of the twenty-eight death row inmates affected by the Simmons ruling.  
Lisa Falkenberg, Perry Spares Juvenile Killers, HOUSTON CHRON., June 23, 2005, at B1.  
The commuted sentence was life imprisonment, which, at the time the minors were 
sentenced, was the only alternative to execution.  Id.  Texas subsequently amended the 
penal code to permit life imprisonment without possibility of parole.  2005 TEX. SESS. 
LAW SERV. 2707 (West) (to be codified as Tex. Penal Code § 12.31, effective Sept. 1, 
2005). 
 72. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1195 (2005). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (quoting Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental 
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339 (1992)). 
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people can marry, serve on juries, vote, drink alcohol, and contract.76  
Juveniles act impulsively, and therefore cannot accurately assess the 
consequences of their behavior.77  Impulsivity means that even “good 
kids, who know right from wrong sometimes do stupid things.”78  They 
engage in unprotected sex which often results in out of wedlock 
pregnancies and disease;79 they “do drugs;”80 drink enough to die from 
alcohol poisoning, even in college;81 drive recklessly causing their own 
death and that of others;82 and are at serious risk of committing suicide.83  
 76. Id. (“[A]lmost every State prohibits those under 18 years of age from voting, 
serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent.”); see also Appendices B, C, and 
D of the Court’s opinion illustrating that the majority of states have set the age limit for 
voting, serving on a jury, and marrying without parental consent at eighteen.  Id. at 1202-
04. 
 77. See Colin P. Mahon, Balance Between Strictly Obeying Supreme Court 
Precedent and Overruling Outmoded Concepts of Capital Punishment, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. 
REV. 937, 967-68 (2004) (“[O]ne researcher said that ‘the human brain is not fully 
mature before reaching adulthood, and that furthermore the brain regions that are the 
most important for regulating impulse control, planning, consideration or consequences, 
abstract reasoning and most probably, moral judgment are the very regions that mature 
last.’”) (quoting Ruben C. Gur, Declaration of Ruben C. Gur, Ph.D., http://www. 
abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/Gur%20affidavit.pdf); see also Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, 
and the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales for a Categorical Exemption for Juveniles From 
Capital Punishment, 33 N.M. L. REV. 207, 207 (2003) (comparing the “limitations in 
developmental capacities that characterize mentally retarded defendants” with those that 
“characterize a significant proportion of adolescent offenders”). 
 78. Paul Raeburn, Too Immature for the Death Penalty?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 
17, 2004, at 26, 29. 
 79. “Today, nearly 70 percent of all high school seniors engage in sexual 
intercourse before graduating, one in eight contracts a sexually transmitted disease 
(STD) each year and more than 80 percent of all STD cases occur among those under 
29.”  Pamela Peeke, Sex & Your Teen; What Parents & Health Care Professionals 
Should Know, NAT’L WOMEN’S HEALTH REP., June 2002, at 8.  Although teen pregnancy 
rates have fallen in the last decade, most of this decrease is a result of increased 
contraceptive use.  About one third of teen pregnancies end in abortion.  Teen Pregnancy, 
Abortion Rates Continue Decline, ST. GOV’T NEWS, Apr. 2004, at 10. 
 80. See Erik Goldman, Teen Drug Use Has Changed Little Since 1970s, FAM. 
PRACTICE NEWS, Mar. 15, 2005, at 11 (stating that recreational use of marijuana today is 
as common among teens as it was during the height of the drug culture).  But see 
Michael J. Stoil, Teen Drug Use’s Changing Profile: The Bush Administration Claims a 
Victory in Reducing Teen Drug Abuse, But the Data Also Show Some Disturbing Trends, 
BEHAV. HEALTH MGMT., May-June 2005, at 9 (reporting a government survey indicating 
that past-month illegal drug use among teens had fallen in recent years). 
 81. An estimated 1400 college students die as a direct or indirect result of alcohol 
consumption each year. Robert Davis, Five Binge-Drinking Deaths ‘Just the Tip of the 
Iceberg,’ USA TODAY, Oct. 7, 2004, at 11D. 
 82. “Nationwide, young drivers make up 6 percent of the driving population, yet 
are involved in nearly 20 percent of all fatal motor vehicle crashes—about one in five.”  
Lisa Rosetta, Utah’s Teen Drivers are Safer than Most, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 1, 2005, 




All parents of teenagers have to contend with the problem of impulsivity 
and have greater or lesser success in helping their children to think 
before acting.  It is true that there are adults who continue to engage in  
reckless and impulsive behavior, but this conduct is much more common 
in children and much less prevalent in adults.84
The second characteristic the Court focused on in differentiating 
juveniles from adults was the effect of outside influences on the 
child’s behavior.85  Indeed, adolescence and peer pressure are inextricably 
linked—from clothing fads86 to antisocial behavior.87  “To be different” 
is to be an outcast and excluded from the “in cliques.”  Street gangs, 
with their colors and their initiation rites, exemplify the power of peer 
at A1.  “Adolescent drivers tend to engage in numerous risky behaviors including 
speeding which has been found to significantly correlate with a greater risk for 
accidents.”  Sheila Sarkar & Marie Andreas, Acceptance of and Engagement in Risky 
Driving Behaviors by Teenagers, 39 ADOLESCENCE 687, 687-88 (2004). 
 83. See Richard Fossey & Perry A. Zirkel, Liability for Student Society in the 
Wake of Eisel, 10 TEX. WESLYAN L. REV. 403, 403-04 (2004) (“[S]uicide is the second 
leading cause of death for teenagers.”). While the suicide mortality rate for youth is 
comparable to the population rate, the percentage of youth who attempt suicide is 
believed to be considerably greater than the attempt rate for adults.  The American 
Association of Suicidology (AAS) estimates that for every successful teen suicide 
attempt, there are between 100 and 200 abortive attempts and that 8.8% (nearly one in 
eleven) high school-aged youth attempted suicide annually. American ASSOCIATION OF 
SUICIDOLOGY, YOUTH SUICIDE FACT SHEET (Mar. 19, 2004), http://www.suicidology.org/ 
associations/1045/files/YouthSuicide.pdf.  However, the AAS estimates that the general 
population attempts-to-suicides ratio is only twenty-five to one and as low as four to one  
for the elderly, with an estimated 790,000 suicide attempts for the general population 
in 2002.  AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SUICIDOLOGY, U.S.A. SUICIDE: 2002 OFFICIAL 
FINAL DATA, Oct. 16, 2004, available at http://www.suicidology.org/associations/ 
1045/files/2002FinalData.pdf. 
 84. Jeffrey Arnett, The Young and the Reckless: Adolescent Reckless Behavior, 4 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 67, 67 (1995) (noting that adolescents are more 
likely to engage in sensation-seeking, egocentric and aggressive behaviors than are 
adults, and that biology and social values conspire to promote reckless behavior among 
adolescents). 
 85. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1195 (2005). 
 86. See Michael S. Jellinek, Flexibility Buffers Shock of Teen Fads, PEDIATRIC 
NEWS, Nov. 2003, at 16 (arguing that adolescent faddish behavior and teenage 
rebelliousness is normal, developmentally-appropriate behavior which helps form a 
bridge from childhood to adulthood); see also Michael K. Meyerhoff, The Rule of Uncle 
Harry’s Funeral (Dealing with Teenage Fads & Rebellion), PEDIATRICS FOR PARENTS, 
Aug. 1997, at 8 (“It is painfully clear that adolescents are characterized more by 
impulsiveness, recklessness, and susceptibility to peer pressure than they are by 
sensitivity, forethought, and compassion for their families.”). 
 87. Christopher Slobogin et. al., A Prevention Model of Juvenile Justice: The 
Promise of Kansas v. Hendricks for Children, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 185, 198 (“[A]dolescents 
are more likely than adults to be influenced by others, both in terms of how they evaluate 
their own behavior and in the sense of conforming to what peers are doing.”). 
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pressure.88  This susceptibility is magnified by the impulsive behavior of 
adolescents.89  For example, when  teenagers are invited to play “chicken,” 
they will often do it because they want to be part of the group and 
because they do not think anything can happen to them.90  Children’s 
understanding of death is intellectual, not emotional.91
The most telling and objective difference between adults and 
adolescents is in brain development.  Abigail Baird, a developmental 
neuroscientist at Dartmouth, conducted a study that highlights these 
differences.92  In Baird’s study, adults, as well as children aged twelve 
through seventeen, were asked to identify emotions on faces in 
photographs.93  As they observed the faces their brain functions were 
monitored by a MRI scanner that enabled scientists to determine which 
parts of the brain were being used.94  When adults viewed the faces, the 
amygdala section of the brain activated, alerting the person that the 
image was important,95 then the frontal lobe assessed the situation, 
checking the person’s memory and other parts of the brain so as to 
“coordinate a response.”96  Almost uniformly, adults were able to 
identify the emotions being displayed accurately.97  Teenagers, on the 
 88. Geoffrey P. Hunt & Karen Joe Laidler, Alcohol and Violence in the Lives of 
Gang Members, 25 ALCOHOL RES. & HEALTH 66, 67-68 (2001) (discussing gang rituals, 
including colors, violence, and “symbolic drinking”). 
 89. See Slobogin, supra note 87, at 197 (“[A]dolescents tend to focus more on 
short-term consequences and less on the long-term impact of a decision or behavior.”). 
 90. “Often, traffic officers say, crashes happen after teenagers dare each other to 
drive as fast as possible.  Or they run red lights.  They race and play chicken.  They sit 
on each other’s laps, trying to see how many friends they can jam into one car and block 
the driver’s view.  Sometimes, they’re drunk or high on drugs.”  Kristina Sauerwein, 
Teens, Cars Can Be Deadly Mix, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 28, 1996, at 1A (noting 
further that teens “think they can do anything” and that “nothing will ever happen”). 
 91. See Linda Goldman, Counseling with Children in Contemporary Society, 26 J. 
MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING 168, 169-71 (2004) (detailing Piaget’s cognitive stages of 
development for children and showing that adolescents think about death in logical 
terms). 
 92. Abigail A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial 
Affect Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT 
PSYCHIATRY 195 (1999) (scientific journal article describing study); Raeburn, supra note 
78, at 26-29 (popular news article reporting on the study). 
 93. Baird, supra note 92, at 196.  There were twelve children in the study, all of them 
healthy.  The mean age of the sample was 13.9 years.  Baird admits the sample is small 
and she suggests that further studies using a larger sample be conducted.  Id. at 198. 
 94. Id. at 196-97; Raeburn, supra note 78, at 28. 
 95. Baird, supra note 92, at 196; Raeburn, supra note 78, at 28. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 




other hand, often misidentified the emotions.98  For example, “when 
shown a face expressing fear . . . they would identify it as surprise, or even 
happiness.”99  In this situation, a teen’s amygdala, the brain’s alarm 
system, works properly, but the prefrontal cortex, the brain’s interpreter, 
does not.100  “The amygdala zeroed in on the faces as something 
important, but the frontal lobes couldn’t focus enough to get the 
identification right.”101
The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 
(AACAP) “determined that the brain does not physically stop maturing 
until a person is about 20 years old.”102  Other studies demonstrate “that 
the brain continues to develop until the mid-20s, and it does so in an 
unexpected way.”103  Gray matter and its connections increase until they 
become excessive.  The brain then starts trimming the gray matter and its 
connections while at the same time reinforcing other connections—
“wrapping them with white matter, a heavier layer of insulation also 
known as myelin.  This pruning and reinforcement represents the 
maturing of the brain.  The process continues into the mid-20s.”104  This 
means that an adolescent’s personality and character are not static.105  The 
 98. Baird, supra note 92, at 196; Raeburn, supra note 78, at 28.  Baird states “that 
the subjects were not able to identify consistently the correct facial expression.”  Baird, 
supra note 92, at 198. 
 99. Raeburn, supra note 78, at 28. 
 100. Baird, supra note 92, at 198; Raeburn, supra note 78, at 28. 
 101. Raeburn, supra note 78, at 28 (quoting Dr. Baird). 
 102. Michael Stark, Editorial, A Case for Concern, WASH. POST, June 8, 2003, at 
B8.  The AACAP later joined in several medical associations’ amicus brief filed in 
Roper v. Simmons; the brief stated that “[c]utting-edge brain imaging technology reveals 
that regions of the adolescent brain do not reach a fully mature state until after the age of 
18.”  Brief for the American Medical Association et al. at 2, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. 
Ct. 1183 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549. 
 103. Raeburn, supra note 78, at 26. 
 104. Id. at 28; see also Abigail A. Baird & Jonathan A. Fugelsang, The Emergence 
of Consequential Thought: Evidence From Neuroscience, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: 
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1797 (2004); Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability and the Adolescent 
Brain, 305 SCI. MAG. 596, 596 (2004); Lee Bowman, New Research Shows Stark 
Differences in Teen Brains, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, May 11, 2004, 
http://www. deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=27&did=1000. 
 105. Moreover, the process of becoming an adult does not follow a linear trajectory.  
Baird and Fugelsang, supra note 104, at 1803, compare the process of adolescent 
maturation with the process by which infants learn how to walk: 
While an infant is learning to walk, there may be days when they pull 
themselves up on the furniture or their parents, they may also balance on their 
feet without holding onto anything.  As anyone who has witnessed an infant 
learning to walk can report, the first few steps are usually followed by a tumble 
and sporadic reattempts.  They may take their first steps one day, and then not 
walk again for several days following this initial foray.  We acknowledge that 
this process is nonlinear and a result of the interaction of both an immature 
brain and lack of experience.  Within the developing adolescent, the emergence of 
adult levels of reasoning is no different.  An adolescent may demonstrate an 
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child at sixteen or seventeen is not the adult he or she will be at thirty.  
Therefore, punishing adolescents the same as adults is akin to punishing 
them for a developmental lag.  Furthermore, even though teenagers may 
appear to be mature, they are not.  “When everything is perfect, they can 
act like adults.  But you add a little bit of stress, and they can break 
down.”106
This maturation process “can be severely retarded by abuse and 
neglect—conditions that affect most juvenile offenders on death row.”107  
The American Academy of Pediatrics has identified several risk factors 
that can incite violence in adolescents, including: exposure to domestic 
violence and substance abuse within the home, sexual or physical assault, 
and a lack of adult supervision.108  A 1987 study of fourteen juveniles 
sentenced to death (which was forty percent of the total number of 
juveniles on death row at the time) revealed that nine of them had 
“major neuropsychological abnormalities” and seven had psychotic 
disorders since early childhood.109  Twelve of the juveniles had been 
“brutally, physically abused and five had been sodomized by older male 
relatives.”110
adult-like ability to reason abstractly, and act in accordance with this advanced 
cognition on Monday, but behave impulsively and irrationally on Thursday.  
What these two examples have in common is the idea that the appearance of a 
behaviour does not indicate its permanence.  Adolescence is an awkward time, 
both in terms of movement and thinking, during which the individual becomes 
increasingly coordinated. 
 106. Raeburn, supra note 78, at 29. 
 107. NATIONAL COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY, FACT SHEET: JUVENILE 
DEATH PENALTY, http://www.ncadp.org/fact_sheet1.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005). 
 108. American Academy of Pediatrics Task Force on Violence, The Role of the 
Pediatrician in Youth Violence Prevention in Clinical Practice and at the Community 
Level, 103 PEDIATRICS 173, 174 (1999), available at http://aappolicy.aappublications. 
org/cgi/reprint/pediatrics;103/1/173.pdf (noting eleven risk factors for adolescent violence 
which pediatricians should be aware of); American Bar Association Juvenile Justice 
Center, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: The Juvenile Death Penalty—Adolescence, 
Brain Development and Legal Culpability, at 3, http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/ 
Adolescence.pdf (2004) (citing policy statement of the American Academy of Pediatrics 
Task Force). 
 109. Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational, and 
Family Characteristics of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United States, 145 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 584, 584-85 (1988).  There were thirty-seven juveniles condemned to 
death at the time of Lewis’s study.  Id. at 584 (“[W]e welcomed the opportunity to 
conduct comprehensive assessments of approximately 40% of the 37 juveniles who are 
currently awaiting execution in the United States.”). 
 110. Id. at 586-87.  The authors further noted that the juveniles studied—as well as 
their parents and lawyers—were often hesitant to speak about their broken pasts, 




A more recent study examining all the juveniles on death row, and 
twenty adolescents who had been executed, came to similar conclusions 
noting that “the mitigating factors [of severe abuse] . . . were not presented 
at trial.”111  The researcher found that 
[o]n average, . . . twenty executed juvenile offenders suffered from five of the 
nine traumatic life-determinant factors during childhood, [including] serious 
physical and/or sexual abuse; and/or regular abuse of drugs or alcohol from an 
early age; and/or historical family abuse of drugs and/or alcohol; and/or mental 
illness, brain damage, and mental retardation. . . .  Most children and adolescents in 
society do not experience even one of these life-determinant traumatic factors.  
The correlative effect of these multiple factors is overwhelming.  This was the 
situation for every juvenile offender, bar one, who has been executed in the 
United States since 1973.112
We are not contending that these differences exculpate minors from 
punishment.  Violent teenagers kill and maim and rape and they must be 
stopped.  If society permitted victims or victims’ families to deal with 
such children, no doubt most people would opt to kill the aggressor.  
However, once punishment is taken over by the state, the need for 
vengeance must be curtailed.  That is why the courts have created 
elaborate structures that allow the feelings of retribution to be filtered 
through the rational process of measuring culpability.  The decision 
whether to inflict the death penalty is not solely rational and not solely 
irrational; it is an attempt to make a “reasoned moral response” to an 
inexcusable, but explainable act.113  If vengeance overrides reason that 
fine balance is skewed. 
As the law now stands, adolescents cannot be sentenced to death.  
They are, however, subject to adult sanctions which are often very 
severe.  This happens for one of two reasons.  One, the state, across the 
board, defines adults for all criminal law purposes as sixteen or 
seventeen and older.  Two, the children who would ordinarily be within 
the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts are waived to criminal court to be 
tried as adults.  Very often the deciding factor for the transfer is the 
“systematically conceal[ing] factors in their lives that were most likely to mitigate a 
death sentence.”  Id. at 588. 
 111. Chris Mallet, Socio-Historical Analysis of Juvenile Offenders on Death Row, 
39 CRIM. L. BULL. 445, 452 (2003).  The failure of counsel to find and present such 
mitigating evidence raises Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel issues.  
See Ellen Marrus and Irene M. Rosenberg, Roper v. Simmons: Dancing With Death, 
CRIM. L. BULL (forthcoming) (claiming that the Simmons categorical bar was in part a 
response to the Court’s fuzzy reasonableness standard as set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). 
 112. Id. at 452-53. 
 113. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response 
to the defendant’s background, character, and crime rather than mere sympathy or 
emotion.”). 
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severity of the crime.  The lesser culpability of the offender gets lost in 
the shuffle.  We argue that just as the differences between adolescents 
and adults are relevant to capital punishment, they also must be 
considered in the decision to transfer and in the legislative determination 
that adolescents are adults. 
IV.  WAIVER—HOW CHILDREN BECOME ADULTS 
Kent v. United States,114 the first of the Supreme Court cases 
“domesticating” the theretofore unregulated juvenile courts, involved a 
judicial waiver law in the District of Columbia.115  The Court held that 
the juvenile court judge must hold a hearing and receive evidence 
regarding the child’s amenability to treatment as a juvenile offender.116  
The importance of the waiver decision is reflected in the Kent opinion. 
The Court concluded that determining whether to transfer a juvenile to 
criminal court was a “critical stage of the proceedings.”117  Due process 
therefore required that there be a hearing, a right to counsel with access 
to the probation files, and a statement of reasons for the transfer so as to 
permit meaningful appellate review.118
Many states were apprehensive about the injection of due process into 
what had been a perfunctory proceeding presided over by a judge whose 
 114. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
 115. If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with an offense which  
would amount to a felony in the case of an adult, or any child charged with an 
offense which if committed by an adult is punishable by death or life 
imprisonment, the judge may, after full investigation, waive jurisdiction and 
order such child held for trial under the regular procedure of the court which 
would have jurisdiction of such offense if committed by an adult; or such other 
court may exercise the powers conferred upon the juvenile court in this 
subchapter in conducting and disposing of such cases. 
D.C. Code § 11-1553 (1965) (current version at D.C. Code § 16-2307 (West 2005)). 
 116. Kent, 383 U.S. at 557. 
 117. Id. at 553 (“[T]he statute does not permit the Juvenile Court to determine in 
isolation and without the participation or any representation of the child the ‘critically 
important’ question whether a child will be deprived of the special protections and 
provisions of the Juvenile Court Act.”). 
 118. Id. at 557 (“[A]s a condition to a valid waiver order, petitioner is entitled to a 
hearing, including access by his counsel to the social records and probation or similar 
reports which presumably are considered by the court, and to a statement of reasons for 
the Juvenile Court’s decision.  We believe that this result is required by the statute read 
in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of 
counsel.”). 




discretion was insulated from any challenge.119  It could be argued that 
states did not have to create juvenile courts,120 and therefore due process 
protection was unnecessary—because if the state had the greater power 
to charge all juveniles as adults, presumably the state had the lesser 
power to deny juvenile court protection to certain minors.121  This 
argument, however, did not obviate the need for due process.  While it is 
true that the state did not have to create juvenile courts, once it did so, 
the decision to deprive certain children of the benefits of those courts 
had to comport with due process fundamental fairness.122
Kent prompted states to reexamine their waiver statutes.123  Most 
states revised their judicial transfer laws so as to incorporate Kent’s due 
process protection in greater or lesser degrees.124  States unhappy with 
the Kent ruling enacted statutes to overcome the Kent judicial waiver 
requirements.125  In some jurisdictions, prosecutors were empowered by 
 119. Norman Lefstein, Kent v. United States Supreme Court Juvenile Case, 17 JUV. 
CT. JUDGES J. 20, 23 (1967) (“‘Several justices appeared deeply disturbed by the Juvenile 
Court’s apparently unlimited power to make the fateful transfer decision from evidence 
that the youth and his lawyer had no right to see or dispute.’”) (quoting John P. 
MacKenzie, Justices Grapple With Juvenile Case, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1966, at A3). 
 120. See Woodward v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[T]reatment 
as a juvenile is not an inherent right but one granted by the state legislature, therefore the 
legislature may restrict or qualify that right as it sees fit, as long as no arbitrary or 
discriminatory classification is involved.”).  Irene Merker Rosenberg, Winship Redux: 
1970 to 1990, 69 TEX. L. REV. 109, 122 (1990). 
 121. Cf. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205-11 (1977) (holding that since 
the state had no obligation to permit manslaughter as an affirmative defense, if it did so, 
it could require the defendant to establish that defense by a preponderance of the 
evidence). 
 122. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (discussing the right to 
counsel on a first appeal and stating that “[b]ut where the merits of the one and only 
appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an 
unconstitutional line has been drawn”); Charles L. Merz, Representing the Juvenile 
Defendant in Waiver Proceedings, 12 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 424, 429 (1968) (“While at one 
time it may have been possible for the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction in a summary 
manner, the Kent case has now made it clear that a child is entitled to a fair 
determination of the question before jurisdiction may be transferred.”); cf. Evitts v. 
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 400-01 (1985) (“The right to appeal would be unique among state 
actions if it could be withdrawn without consideration of applicable due process norms.  
For instance, although a State may choose whether it will institute any given welfare 
program, it must operate whatever programs it does establish subject to the protections of 
the Due Process Clause.”). 
 123. See Sacha M. Coupet, What to Do with the Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: The Role 
of Rhetoric and Reality about Youth Offenders in the Constructive Dismantling of the 
Juvenile Justice System, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1303, 1314 (2000) (“Kent v. United States 
began a period of re-analysis of the juvenile justice system . . . .”). 
 124. See Melissa A. Scott, The “Critically Important” Decision of Waiving Juvenile 
Court Jurisdiction: Who Should Decide?, 50 LOY. L. REV. 711, 729 (2004) (“The factors 
the Kent Court enumerated are not mandatory, but most states that use judicial waiver 
have incorporated the Kent factors into their judicial waiver statute.”). 
 125. See Ed Kinkeade, Appellate Juvenile Justice in Texas—It’s a Crime! Or 
Should Be, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 17, 34-35 (1999) (“[S]tate legislatures have continued to 
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statute to make the transfer decision without any procedural safeguards.126  
Such statutes were upheld on the theory that the prosecutor’s determination 
was akin to charging decisions over which district attorneys have 
almost complete discretion.127  Thus, such laws equated the decision 
regarding whether to charge a suspect with a misdemeanor or a felony, 
the same as whether to charge a minor in juvenile or adult court.  In 
either situation, so the courts asserted, the suspect would have a trial at 
which he or she could be exonerated.128  However, it is not innocence or 
guilt that is relevant in these proceedings.  Innocence could also be 
established in juvenile court.  States with such statutes failed to see that 
the charging decision completely determined the sentencing options if 
the juvenile was ultimately convicted.129
narrow juvenile court jurisdiction and designate more and more waivable offenses.”); see 
also Scott, supra note 124, at 733-34, 736 (asserting that legislative waivers limit or 
eliminate the juvenile court jurisdiction by either excluding certain juveniles from the 
definition of a juvenile or mandating that juveniles of a certain age who committed a 
certain offense are prosecuted as adults and arguing that prosecutional waivers avoid the 
juvenile court’s jurisdiction because the district attorney decides whether or not to try the 
individual in criminal court without allowing the juvenile a hearing to prove he or she 
should not be tried as an adult). 
 126. See id. at 736 (“The district attorney has the discretion to choose if the juvenile 
shall be adjudicated in juvenile court or tried as an adult in criminal court.”). 
 127. See United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (concluding 
that due process does not require “an adversary hearing before the prosecutor can 
exercise his age-old function of deciding what charge to bring against whom”); Scott, 
supra note 124, at 736 (“In making this decision, the district attorney is empowered to 
exercise his ‘age-old function’ of prosecutorial decision-making.”). 
 128. Bland, 472 F.2d at 1338 (“It in no manner relieves the Government of its 
obligation to prove appellee’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Nor does it remove 
appellee’s right to a jury trial.”). 
 129. See Harris v. Procunier, 498 F.2d 576, 581-82 (9th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 419 
U.S. 970 (1974) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).  The court noted that: 
[t]he fitness hearing has no direct counterpart in the usual adult criminal 
process.  The purpose of the proceeding, unlike an indictment or preliminary 
hearing, is not to establish probable cause for the initiation of further action.  
The hearing is designed to determine, based on an evaluation of the youth, his 
background, and his criminal history, the nature of response the state should 
make upon a determination of guilt.  Thus, to the extent that it can be 
analogized to a stage in the criminal prosecution, the fitness hearing most 
nearly resembles a sentencing proceeding by the trial judge. . . . By finding that 
a youth is not a fit subject for exercise of juvenile court jurisdiction, the court 
determines that the accused, if found guilty, will be sentenced as an adult 
rather than receive non-punitive rehabilitation pursuant to the options available 
to the juvenile court under . . . the [juvenile] [c]ode. 
Id.; see also Stacey Sabo, Rights of Passage: An Analysis of Waiver of Juvenile Court 
Jurisdiction, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2449-50 (1996) (“[U]nder a system of 




Other jurisdictions took a slightly different path, although in essence 
one similar to prosecutorial waiver.  Some legislatures, instead of explicitly 
giving the district attorney the power to waive, wrote the statute defining 
a juvenile in such a way as to exclude persons of a certain age who were 
charged with certain crimes.130  In those scenarios, at least theoretically, 
the district attorney has no discretion and has to file charges in adult 
criminal court because the defendant by definition is not a juvenile.131  
The determination of what charges should be brought, however, is of 
course up to the prosecutor.132  The district attorney could circumvent 
the legislative waiver statute simply by charging the minor with a lesser 
offense which would keep the youth within the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court.  They could also do the converse.  Therefore, functionally, in 
many states legislative waiver works much the same as prosecutorial 
waiver.  In neither case is there a judicial proceeding at which relevant 
facts are explored by a neutral third party whose decision is subject to 
review.  This is to be distinguished from statutes which simply declare 
that an adult is anyone over the age of sixteen or seventeen.  No waiver 
is involved in such cases and neither a judge nor a prosecutor can make 
such persons a juvenile regardless of the charge. 
Every state has some form of waiver.  Some states have more than one 
type of waiver statute, which gives the prosecutor several options when 
deciding whether a juvenile should be tried in adult criminal court. 
A.  Judicial Waiver 
More than forty jurisdictions have enacted judicial waiver laws.133  
Typically, the statutes enumerate certain matters the juvenile court judge 
is required to consider in making this determination.  Generally, these 
factors were derived from the Court’s appendix in Kent.134  Kent did not 
mandate the use of these considerations, but nevertheless many states 
concurrent jurisdiction, deciding how to charge the juvenile allows the prosecutor to 
further choose the forum in which to try her.”). 
 130. See id. at 2443-45 (“Legislative waiver . . . categorically excludes from juvenile 
court jurisdiction certain juveniles or offenses. . . . The rationale behind legislative waiver is 
simple: charge serious, violent, or persistent juvenile offenders like adult criminals.”). 
 131. Id. 
 132. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION 
FUNCTION STANDARDS, standard 3-3.4, 3-3.9 (3d ed. 1993). 
 133. Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without 
Parole on Juveniles 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 688 (1998) (“In a three-year period, 
between 1992 to 1995, forty jurisdictions enacted or expanded provisions for juvenile 
waiver to adult court.”). 
 134. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966). 
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incorporated them into their own laws.135  The following are the eight 
factors listed in Kent: the seriousness of the alleged offense and whether 
it was committed in an aggressive, violent or premeditated manner; 
whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, with the 
weight leaning more toward waiver if it was against a person; the 
prosecutorial merit of the complaint; the sophistication, maturity and 
prior record of the offender; the need for public safety; and the chance of 
rehabilitation of the juvenile through current available treatments.136  
These factors are not dissimilar to those considered by juries when 
deliberating to determine punishment.  The difference is that waiver is 
always decided by a single judge. 
Some states have incorporated the factors exactly as laid out in the 
Kent case.  Others have modified or added matters for juvenile court 
judges to consider.  The additional factors may be whether the alleged 
offense was related to gang activity;137 if it was committed on school 
property or at any school-related event and whether other students were 
put in danger;138 the alleged offender’s relationship to the victim139 and 
the impact on him or her;140 the potential for rehabilitation if the 
jurisdiction provides parenting or family counseling;141 whether the 
juvenile can develop sufficient life skills to become a contributing 
member of society;142 whether the child is mentally ill or mentally 
 135. Scott, supra note 124, at 729; see PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., TRYING JUVENILES 
AS ADULTS IN CRIMINAL COURT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER PROVISIONS 3 (1998) 
(describing state transfer procedures for juveniles). 
 136. Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-67. 
 137. The courts will consider whether “the juvenile committed the alleged offense 
while participating in, assisting, promoting or furthering the interests of a criminal street 
gang, a criminal syndicate or a racketeering enterprise.”  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-327 
(1999).  Stout v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 781, 786, 786 n.15 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he 
factor . . . concerning gang participation, was added to the list effective July 15, 1998.”). 
 138. The courts will consider “[w]hether the alleged offense was committed on 
school property, public or private, or at any school-sponsored event, and constituted a 
substantial danger to other students.”  MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-157 (2004). 
 139. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.12(D)(3) (West 2005). 
 140. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-327(D)(7) (1999); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. § 3-817 (c)(2)(iii) (Lexis Nexis Supp. 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-518 
(4)(b)(VIII) (West 2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(A) (West 2000). 
 141. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2307(e)(6) (Lexis Nexis 2001). 
 142. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-508(8)(f) (2004). 




retarded;143 and catchall provisions, in which judges must also consider 
any other relevant factors or evidence that bear on the transfer decision.144
The judicial waiver statutes also differ in other ways.  Sometimes the 
law gives the judges complete discretion to transfer, at least as long as 
the evidence supports the decision.145 Other statutes require transfer if a 
certain number of factors weigh in favor of it.146  Most mandate that 
juveniles be a certain age and be charged with certain offenses before a 
judge is allowed to consider transferring a juvenile to adult court.147  
Others use presumptions if certain factors are present or weigh specific 
factors differently.148  In Florida a child may choose voluntary waiver to 
criminal court.149
In addition, the states use a wide age range in their judicial waiver 
statutes.  The most common age for transfer seems to be fourteen years 
old,150  although several states go below that age and permit transfer for 
juveniles who are twelve151 or thirteen years old.152  Three states—Texas, 
Indiana, and Vermont—allow juveniles who committed offenses when 
 143. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(1)(c)(4)(c) (Supp. 2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 6355(a)(4)(iv) (West 2000). 
 144. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-22(c)(8) (LexisNexis 1993 & Supp 2004); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 32A-2-20(C)(8) (West 2004). 
 145. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-34 (d)-(f) (West 2005) (stating that although a 
juvenile judge has the discretion whether or not to transfer a child to criminal court, the 
judge must consider several factors when making this decision and provide written 
findings including probable cause that the allegations are true).  But see Barry C. Feld, 
The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile 
Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 491 (1987) (positing that the Kent 
guidelines do not really provide objective guidelines for juvenile judges, giving them 
unlimited discretion in deciding when to transfer juveniles to criminal court). 
 146. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1606(2) (1999). 
 147. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805 (2)(3) (2005). 
 148. It is interesting to note, for example, that the Utah judicial waiver statute 
initially appears to provide for automatic transfer, however, every juvenile is entitled to a 
hearing and it is within the judge’s discretion to keep him or her in juvenile court.  See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-602 (2002 & Supp. 2005). 
 149. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.226 (1) (West 2001).  Presumably children choose this 
option because they believe they would receive a lesser punishment in criminal court.  
This can occur if the child is charged with a relatively minor offense.  In criminal court 
the statutory limits may be quite low.  In juvenile court, however, children can be sent to 
state training schools for their majority even if the offense is not serious.  In In re Gault, 
387 U.S. 1, 29 (1967), the offense with which the child was charged would have been 
punishable in criminal court by no more than two months in jail or a fine, whereas in 
juvenile court he was sentenced to incarceration until the age of majority [twenty-one].  
Since Gerald Gault was fifteen, it meant that he received a six year sentence.  Id. 
 150. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1636(a)(2) (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 
(1)(c)(1) (Supp 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.125 (West 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 712A.4(1) (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.18(1)(a)(1) (West 2000). 
 151. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602(1)(b)(ii) (2005). 
 152. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-151(3) (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2200 (2004); 
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 405/5-805(3)(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2005). 
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they were as young as ten to be transferred to adult court under very 
limited circumstances.153
Although the judicial waiver hearing is held prior to the determination 
of guilt, it is conceptually much like a sentencing hearing.154  In effect, 
the juvenile court judge is determining whether the child, if convicted, 
should receive a sentence under the juvenile code or under the penal 
code.  It is the most critical decision facing a child in juvenile court. 
B.  Prosecutorial Waiver 
A few years after the Kent decision, Congress revamped the juvenile 
code in the District of Columbia.  The code defined juvenile offenders as 
those under eighteen except for those sixteen and older who were 
charged by the United States Attorney with murder, rape, and other 
serious offenses.155  The D.C. Circuit in United States v. Bland 156 upheld 
the statute against both due process and equal protection attacks, and 
acknowledged that the new law was a response to the “‘substantial 
difficulties in transferring juvenile offenders charged with serious felonies 
to the jurisdiction of the adult court under present law.’”157  The dissenters 
viewed the Kent decision as of constitutional proportions, and therefore 
the government was prohibited from creating “a second parallel waiver 
procedure” by “definition.”158  Indeed, the dissent argued that “the transfer 
of the waiver decision from the neutral judge to the partisan prosecutor 
increases rather than diminishes the need for due process protection for 
the child.”159
The Bland majority referred to the new code provisions both as a 
“legislative exclusion”160 and as an “exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”161  
 153. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §54.02(j)(2)(a) (Vernon 2002); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 31-30-3-4(3) (Lexis Nexis 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5506(a) (2001). 
 154. See Harris v. Procunier, 498 F.2d 576, 581 (1974). 
 155. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301 (Lexis Nexis 2001). 
 156. 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 157. Id. at 1333 (quoting the reasoning given by the House committee for excluding 
those sixteen years and older charged with a serious crime from the Family Division’s 
Jurisdiction). 
 158. Id. at 1340 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
 159. Id. at 1343 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
 160. Id. at 1334.  The court recognized that jurisdictions have often excluded certain 
individuals and crimes from the juvenile justice system.  This statute was no different. 
 161. Id. at 1336.  “While there may be circumstances in which courts would be 
entitled to review the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, these circumstances would 
necessarily include the deliberate presence of such factors as ‘race, religion, or other 




The dissent also viewed the statute in those two ways, although it 
emphasized the prosecutorial discretion aspect of the law.  The use of 
both terms interchangeably reflects the difficulty in distinguishing between 
prosecutorial and legislative waivers. 
After the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Bland,162 with three 
justices dissenting,163 many states followed suit and allowed prosecutors 
to file certain cases in either juvenile court or adult court.  However, 
unlike judicial waiver, a juvenile cannot challenge a direct filing in 
criminal court, and there is no requirement of a hearing before such a 
decision is made by the prosecutor.164  About fifteen jurisdictions have 
procedures whereby prosecuting attorneys can file the indictment or 
information directly in adult court.165  Most statutes specify the minimum 
ages, in some cases as young as twelve,166 and list the specific charges 
that will allow a prosecutor to file adult charges,167 some adding that 
the prosecutor can charge the child in adult court only if he or she has 
previously been adjudicated a delinquent and committed to a state 
institution.168  Therefore, the statutes are substantively limited, for example, 
by age, offense, and prior adjudication in juvenile court; however, within 
those parameters the prosecutors’ charging decisions are completely 
discretionary, unconstrained by procedural due process protections. 
Some states have both discretionary and mandatory prosecutorial 
waiver depending on the age, crime, and previous history of the 
juvenile.169  If a juvenile is of a certain age and charged with any one of 
a litany of felonies, such as arson, robbery, or murder, the prosecutor 
may file directly in adult court.170  In these states, prosecutors are required 
to file charges directly in criminal court when the juvenile is sixteen 
or seventeen, currently being charged with specific felonies, and has 
arbitrary classification,’ not found in the case at bar.”  Id. (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 
U.S. 448, 456 (1962). 
 162. 412 U.S. 909 (1973). 
 163. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented.  Id. 
 164. HOWARD N. SNYDER ET. AL, JUVENILE TRANSFERS TO CRIMINAL COURT IN THE 
1990’S: LESSONS LEARNED FROM FOUR STUDIES, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 4 (2000),  available at http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/publications/ 
PubResults.asp. 
 165. Id. at 48 (Appendix A).  Those jurisdictions are Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, 
the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming.  Id. 
 166. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-206 (2005). 
 167. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-501B (2001 & Supp. 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS   
§ 769.1 (Supp. 2005). 
 168. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 119 § 54 (West Supp. 2005).  In Massachusetts, 
direct filing in criminal court may occur if the juvenile is between fourteen and 
seventeen. 
 169. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.227 (West Supp. 2005). 
 170. Id. 
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been previously adjudicated delinquent for committing one of several 
felonies.171  However, to the extent that the waiver decision depends on 
the current charges, the prosecutor is ultimately making the determination 
of whether to waive regardless of the statutory wording that filing in 
adult court is mandatory. 
C.  Legislative Waiver 
Judicial waiver requires a case by case analysis of each child.  Indeed, 
most judicial waiver statutes mandate psychological and psychiatric 
examinations, and a probation investigation of the child’s home and 
background.172  To some extent that may be true with prosecutorial waiver, 
that is, presumably conscientious district attorneys weigh all the factors 
regarding the child and the crime.173  States, however, do not demand 
such individualized determinations by the prosecutor, and their decisions 
are not subject to appellate review.174  Legislative waiver, also known as 
statutory exclusion, is somewhat different, although, as noted, it is often 
difficult to distinguish it from prosecutorial waiver.  Indeed, transfer 
statutes are almost always categorized as being one of three different 
types of waiver.  They can, however, be viewed as merely two—judicial 
and prosecutorial.  For even if the legislature mandates the prosecutor to 
file charges against the child in criminal court, the prosecutor is the 
official who determines the actual charges.175  Thus, if a prosecutor 
decides that a particular child should not be treated in adult court, he or 
she may simply bring lesser charges.176  To the extent that prosecutors 
 171. Id.  Juveniles of any age may end up in adult court at the discretion of a 
prosecutor if the child is alleged to have committed certain crimes.  The Florida statute 
also requires that the state attorneys develop written policies and guidelines to determine 
when to file charges directly in adult court. 
 172. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(g) (2002 and Supp. 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 19-2-518(4)(b) (West 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-22(b) (1993 & Supp. 2004). 
 173. See Sabo, supra note 129, at 2443 (“[T]he prosecutor may . . . consider such 
factors as the dangerousness of the offense, the juvenile’s prior record, her age, and her 
amenability to juvenile court treatment.”). 
 174. See Scott, supra note 124, at 736 (“[J]uveniles who are subject to prosecutorial 
waiver are not granted the opportunity to prove to the prosecuting attorney that they 
should not be tried as adults.  Further, once the district attorney has decided to prosecute 
the juvenile as an adult, his decision cannot be challenged or appealed.”). 
 175. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 132, at standard 3-3.4, 3-3.9. 
 176. Juan Alberto Arteaga, Juvenile (In)Justice: Congressional Attempts to Abrogate 
the Procedural Rights of Juvenile Defendants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1051, 1067 (2002) 
(“[T]he prosecutor is the one who initially determines whether a juvenile’s alleged crime 
is ‘so serious as to warrant transfer or whether . . . the child is amenable to treatment.’  




dislike the judicial waiver process because of its due process formality 
and what is viewed as an excess of judicial sympathy, the likelihood is 
that prosecutors would lean more toward inflating charges so as to 
ensure that the child is tried in criminal court.177
The legislative waiver statutes purport to exclude children of a certain 
age charged with certain crimes from juvenile court jurisdiction.178  As 
noted above, however, the prosecutor determines the current charges, 
and thus can over or under charge the offense.  Some statutes require a 
child of a certain age to be tried in criminal court if he or she has 
previously been adjudicated a delinquent without reference to the current 
charges.  This is a true legislative waiver statute as there is no room for 
prosecutorial discretion. Currently, at least twenty states allow for 
legislative waiver.  These statutes set the age at which transfer 
becomes automatic as early as thirteen179 and as late as seventeen.180  
In Pennsylvania, there is no age minimum; any juvenile charged with 
murder or criminal homicide is automatically transferred.181
Jurisdictions with legislative waiver have effectively created an 
irrebuttable presumption that children of a certain age who are charged 
with certain crimes are not really children.182  Analogously, although not 
considered a waiver, statutes that define adults for criminal purposes as 
Given the broad discretion already conferred upon prosecutors, one must question 
whether a child’s fate should be placed entirely in the hands of a decisionmaker who is 
not completely neutral.”). 
 177. Id. at 1063 (noting the two responsibilities of prosecutors—prosecuting 
criminals and shielding juveniles from the penal system).  “When asked to weigh one 
interest against the other, though, prosecutors generally will assume their role as 
advocates of the state and tend to err on the side of protecting society.  Once a flawed 
decision has been made to transfer a juvenile to criminal court, prosecutors cannot do 
justice to their second responsibility, given the harshness and length of the potential 
sentences.”  Id. 
 178. See Scott, supra note 124, at 733 (“The legislature generally excludes juveniles 
from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court based on their age and offense.”). 
 179. Mississippi mandates transfer for juveniles as young as thirteen who are 
charged with a crime punishable by life or death or for any act attempted or committed 
with the use of a deadly weapon.  MISS. CODE ANN.§ 43-21-151(1) (2004).  Maryland 
also requires transfer of a juvenile who is charged with a crime punishable by life 
or death, but the minor must be at least fourteen.  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. § 3-8A-03 (Lexis Nexis 2002 & Supp. 2004). 
 180. Montana, for example, only allows for automatic transfer if a juvenile is 
seventeen and is accused of committing one of a long list of offenses, such as rape, 
murder, assault on a peace officer, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary or robbery, 
possession of dangerous drugs, or the use of threat to coerce criminal street gang 
membership.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-206 (2003). 
 181. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6355 (West 2000). 
 182. See Sabo, supra note 129, at 2452 (“If the legislature has decided that the 
crime with which the juvenile is charged should be tried in criminal court, this waiver 
mechanism operates automatically to exclude her from juvenile court jurisdiction, blind 
to her best interests and in disregard of any mitigating factors.”). 
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persons sixteen or seventeen, raise the same concerns that are presented 
in true legislative waiver  statutes—an irrebuttable presumption of legal 
capacity.  Scientific and sociological studies, however, belie that assumption.  
At least as measured by brain development, a child is a child is a child 
until the age of twenty or twenty-five. 
It is our view that courts or legislatures should eliminate waiver of 
children under eighteen regardless of the crime or past history.  To deal 
with the problem of how to treat adolescents nearing eighteen, statutes 
could allow juvenile courts to maintain jurisdiction over the child until 
age twenty-five.  Such an allowance will eliminate arguments that suggest 
waiver is necessary because older adolescents could not be treated in the 
limited time the juvenile courts have jurisdiction. 
If legislatures eschew this approach, a more limited change could be 
considered, such as a presumption against waiver regardless of age, 
seriousness of crime, and past criminal behavior. Furthermore, the 
juvenile courts should be able to consider the kind of evidence that the 
Simmons Court relied on to prohibit the execution of adolescents.  This 
will create little difficulty in the judicial waiver context; the studies 
regarding reduced culpability can be admitted into evidence, as well as 
testimony from experts regarding the particular child’s developmental 
level.  The trial court’s decision will then be subject to review on appeal.  
The jurisdictions that use prosecutorial waiver will face greater obstacles, 
since traditionally the courts generally designate such a decision as 
nonreviewable, either substantively183 or procedurally.184  To assure that 
evidence of developmental lag, immaturity, recklessness, and lesser 
culpability is considered, there must be a list of factors that the district 
attorney must consider when making the charging decision and some 
form of review of prosecutorial decisions in this context.185  Finally, we 
think there should be no automatic legislative waiver.  No two children 
are the same and should not be treated that way even if they are of the 
same age and charged with identical crimes.  We also do not believe that 
states should define adults as including adolescents under eighteen. 
 183. Of course, if the district attorney’s charging decision does not meet the 
substantive requirements for treating a minor as an adult, for example, age, crime, and 
prior offenses, that waiver would be null and void. 
 184. See Bland v. United States, 412 U.S. 909, 912 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“Under the Administrative Procedure Act judicial review of the exercise of executive 
discretion is the rule and unreviewability is the exception.”). 
 185. See Arteaga, supra note 176, at 1067-68 (discussing the need for a check on 
prosecutorial waivers). 




V.  WHY INFLICTION OF SEVERE CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT OR WAIVER OF 
MINORS UNDER EIGHTEEN SHOULD BE PROHIBITED 
When a child is subject to waiver of any sort, the prominent factors 
determining whether the child is to be treated as an adult or a juvenile 
are age, offense, prior adjudications, and, to be frank, the predilections 
of the juvenile court judge.  Except for the latter, those are the same 
factors that the Simmons Court refused to allow a jury to consider in 
deciding whether an adolescent should be subjected to capital 
punishment.  It is true that the Court reached this conclusion in the 
context of the death penalty, but conceptually the Court’s rationale 
describing the differences between adults and adolescents and its 
acceptance of scientific and sociological studies should also apply to 
decisions regarding whether juveniles should be considered adults for 
other criminal law purposes.  If the child’s brain is still growing until 
either twenty or twenty-five (depending on what study one uses), 
subjecting a child to adult punishment, especially life without possibility 
of parole, is irrational.  We do not know who that child will be in five 
years or ten years.  Just as teenagers’ bodies change as they mature, so 
do their brains.  In effect, waiver constitutes a prediction that the child 
is not really a child and cannot be helped within the juvenile court 
system.  This prediction, however, is based on factors that may well be 
different within a few years. 
Predicting future criminality is very speculative.186  The studies show 
that the measures used to make that determination result in a substantial 
inclusion of persons who would not, in fact, engage in the predicted 
criminal behavior.187  Although the Supreme Court has concluded that 
“there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future 
criminal conduct,”188 it has also acknowledged that “some in the 
psychiatric community are of the view that clinical predictions as to 
whether a person would or would not commit violent acts in the future 
are ‘fundamentally of very low reliability,’”189 and noted studies showing 
that “psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness were wrong two 
out of three times.”190  Thus, one cannot know with a high degree of 
certainty which children will become violent predators. 
 186. JOHN MONAHAN, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE CLINICAL 
PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 2-3 (Dep’t Health & Human Services 1981). 
 187. Jack F. Williams, Process and Prediction: A Return to a Fuzzy Model of 
Pretrial Detention, 79 MINN. L. REV. 325, 343-44 (1994). 
 188. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984) (upholding state law allowing for 
detention of children charged with delinquency if there was a “serious risk” that the child 
would commit a criminal act before returning to court). 
 189. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 472 (1981) (citations omitted). 
 190. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 900 n.7 (1983). 
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It is true that the state has a right to punish those who violate the 
criminal law, particularly murderers, even if they would not commit 
crimes in the future.  Retribution has a place in the justification of 
punishment.  Retribution principles do not, however, tell us with any 
specificity how much punishment is necessary for atonement.  In Harmelin 
v. Michigan,191 the Court, five-four,192 upheld a sentence of life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole for possession of cocaine as 
applied to a twenty-one-year-old first offender.193  Justices Scalia and 
Rehnquist denied that proportionality analysis had any place in 
noncapital cases.194  Four dissenters had the opposite view.  Justices 
Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter took an intermediate position, requiring 
that gross disproportionality had to be established.195  Since the latter is 
the narrowest opinion it is the appropriate guide for lower courts.196  
Subjecting youths to adult sentences, particularly those which foreclose 
any possibility of relief, meets that standard of gross disproportionality, 
regardless of the offense the child has committed. 
Nor can such disproportionate punishment be justified on deterrence 
grounds.  As Justice Kennedy noted, “the same characteristics that render 
juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be 
less susceptible to deterrence.”197  Adolescents do not do “cost benefit” 
 191. 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
 192. Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the Court’s 
opinion in part IV in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, 
and Souter joined, and with respect to parts I, II, and III, in which Chief Justice 
Rehnquist joined.  Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment in which Justices O’Connor and Souter joined.  Justice White filed a 
dissenting opinion in which Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined.  Justice Marshall 
filed a dissenting opinion and Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice 
Blackmun joined.  Id. at 957, 996, 1009, 1027. 
 193. Id. at 994, 1009, 1021. 
 194. Id. at 957 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee.”) 
(plurality opinion). 
 195. Id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]ntrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional 
analyses are appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of 
the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross 
disproportionality.”). 
 196. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323, 343-44 (2003) (upholding 
racial diversity admissions program and noting that because of the “Court’s splintered 
decision in Bakke, Justice Powell’s opinion announcing the judgment of the Court has 
served as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions 
policies”). 
 197. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1196 (2005). 




analyses.  Bentham notwithstanding, they act impulsively, with little 
thought of consequences.198
Determining whether a child should be charged in, or waived to, 
criminal court and subjected to severe punishment such as life without 
possibility of parole, requires a value choice.199  Concededly, opting to 
keep a child within the juvenile court system with its generally lower 
sentences risks the possibility of future serious harm to the community.  
However, studies show that long prison sentences for children result in a 
greater likelihood of recidivism.200
The risks on the other side are very high—the virtual destruction of 
young people who might benefit society and live productive lives.  Since 
we know that mistakes in predicting future criminality will be made, and 
that minors have the capacity for growth, which path should we follow?  
The Simmons Court suggests that we err on the side of the child. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
People imagine that children who kill are irredeemable—a “bad seed.”  
Both of us have represented children in juvenile court who were charged 
with serious criminal acts, including murder.  Our experiences tell us 
that even children who commit the most heinous offense, such as joining 
a group of “friends” to stomp an elderly, defenseless person to death, are 
ultimately capable of understanding what they had really done.  After 
release from incarceration in a secure facility for juveniles, many of 
them, although not all, were able to turn their lives around, went to 
school, and found jobs.  This also happens with adults who are killers.  
 198. Id. (“‘The likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-
benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to 
be virtually nonexistent.’”) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988)). 
 199. Id. at 1195-96 (“From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the 
failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s 
character deficiencies will be reformed.”).  For a detailed analysis of life without 
possibility of parole for youthful offenders, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES 3 (2005), http://www.amnestyusa.org/ 
countries/usa/clwop/report.pdf (concluding that although “incarceration may be proper 
for youth convicted of very serious crimes such as murder, . . . a sentence of life without 
the possibility of parole is never appropriate for youth offenders”); see also Adam 
Liptak, Locked Away Forever After Crimes as Teenagers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at 1 
(examining the increase of prisoners who are serving life sentences for crimes committed 
as teenagers) and Adam Liptak, Serving Life, With No Chance of Redemption, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005, at 1 (describing inmates serving sentences of life without possibility 
of parole). 
 200. IRA M. SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES 52-53 (1989) (discussing the 
drop in juvenile recidivism after Massachusetts instituted state wide reform in the 
juvenile justice system by closing state training schools and instituting community based 
programs). 
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When the Supreme Court invalidated the death penalty in 1972,201 the 
sentences of many people on death row were commuted to life 
imprisonment.  Some of them were paroled and most refrained from 
further illegal conduct.202  Admittedly, some did bear the mark of Cain 
and went on to kill and kill again.  The difficulty is that we do not know 
how to differentiate among the different types of murderers.  What we 
do know, however, is that children and adolescents are growing and 
maturing and the chances for them “to make it” are much higher than for 
adults.203  Knowing that, we must be very cautious when exposing 
children to adult punishment.  They are not adults; they are children.  





















 201. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972). 
 202. Joan M. Cheever, A Chance Reprieve, and Another Chance at Life, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 29, 2002, at A15 (noting that 125 of the 200 people that she interviewed 
who had been released on parole after Furman were law-abiding citizens). 
 203. Franklin E. Zimring, Toward a Jurisprudence of Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & 
JUST. 477, 491-92 (1998) (discussing the adolescence stage as a “learning by doing” 
stage that involves learning from decisions and mistakes and that adolescent’s lack of 
maturity allows for “risk-management strategies” that can be used to reduce the 
“consequences from youth crime” that cannot be used on adults). 
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